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We review the existing literature on Java safety, empha-
sizing formal approahes, and the impat of Java safety
on small footprint devies suh as smart ards. The on-
lusion is that while a lot of good work has been done,
a more onerted eort is needed to build a oherent set
of mahine readable formal models of the whole of Java
and its implementation. This is a formidable task but we
believe it is essential to building trust in Java safety.
We have tried to avoid tehnial detail, and to fous
on the bigger issues. The interested reader may wish to
onsult some of the many papers that we refer to ll in
the details.
1 Introdution
Java oers interesting possibilities for building exible and
portable smart ard systems. However, many design and
implementation problems have been, and are being re-
ported in the literature with respet to Java's safety [38℄.
Java is a safe programming language in the sense that
Java programs are type safe and memory safe. The two
main features that bring type and memory safety are
rstly that Java does not oer pointer arithmeti; instead
Java oers referenes to objets whih annot be manufa-
tured by the user but only by the system. Unused objets
are automatially garbage olleted. The seond feature
is that Java is a strongly typed language, like Pasal and
Ada, and unlike C and C++. Java even performs runtime
heks to avoid array index errors.
Java is implemented by ompiling Java programs into
Java Virtual Mahine (JVM) byte odes. The byte odes
are stored in lass les. An interpreter, the JVM, loads
the lass les and exeutes byte odes. The JVM ontrols
aess to all mahine resoures. Safety in Java is there-
fore onsidered language based, as opposed to operating
system based.
A simple (and ineÆient) implementation of safety
would arry out all sorts of runtime heks. Examples
inlude making sure that the operands of an integer add

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instrution are indeed integers, to hek that an objet is
initialised before it is used, and to hek that an index
is within the bounds of an array. It is more eÆient for
the ompiler to perform the type heks. However, other
heks, suh as the array index hek annot normally
performed by the ompiler, and must be delegated to the
run time system. We will disuss some proposals also to
avoid this kind of runtime hek in Setion 5.
Javas' write one, run anywhere philosophy adds an
interesting ompliation by allowing ompiled Java pro-
grams (in the form of lass les) from any soure to be
loaded into the runtime environment. This means that
the heks performed by the ompiler loose their validity
beause it is easy to tamper with lass les while they are
stored, or in transit. Therefore Java implementations nor-
mally inlude a lass loader and a byte ode verier [36℄.
The former takes are of aepting and loading JVM pro-
grams into the Java runtime environment. The latter is
essentially another type heker operating on the JVM
byte odes. We will not say more about the lass loader
here as it mainly deals with ontrolling name spaes and
providing the hooks for a third omponent, the seurity
manager to implement a form of Seurity in Java. Instead
we will onentrate on safety.
Both the lass loader and the byte ode verier do their
work before exeution of the ode from a newly loaded
lass starts. We would argue that even if all the relevant
heks were performed during the exeution of the ode,
whih are now performed at load and veriation time,
Java applets would oer more safety than they do now.
The reason is that many implementation errors [17℄ have
been, and are being unovered in lass loaders, byte ode
veriers, and in partiular in the omplex interplay be-
tween the lass loader, the byte ode verier and the run
time system. Eah single error is a safety loophole. Worse
yet, eah error may give rise to a bug x, and system ad-
ministrators will soon grow tired of installing yet another
bug x [25℄. Operational proedures are often the weakest
element in seurity [2℄.
2 Methodology
If Java is to be a language used to build appliations that
oer safety, it needs to be well dened, so that program-
1
mers understand exatly how to use the language, and
that implementors know how to realise the implementa-
tion, always maintaining the safety. This requires formal
speiations of the following omponents:
 The semantis of Java.
 The semantis of the JVM language.
 The Java to JVM ompiler.
 The runtime support, that is parts of the Java API,
inluding all Java.* lasses. A speiation of the
API is needed beause for example starting and stop-
ping threads is eetuated via the Java API and not
via JVM instrutions.
The methodology to build these speiations and their
implementations should be to:
 Construt lear and onise formal speiations of
the relevant omponents.
 Validate the speiations by animating them, and
by stating and proving relevant properties of the om-
ponents. Examples inlude type soundness (i.e. a
program that is well typed will not go wrong with
a typing error at runtime), and ompiler orretness
(i.e. ompiling a Java program to a JVM program
should preserve the meaning of the program).
 Rene the speiations into implementations, or
alternatively implement the speiation by ad-ho
methods with an a-posteriori orretness proof.
 Create all speiations in mahine-readable form, so
that they an be used as input to theorem provers,
model hekers, and other tools [55℄.
Regardless of Java's laims of being a small and sim-
ple language, whih by omparison to C++ it is, Java
is too omplex and too large to make it easy for a om-
plete formal speiation to be built. It also ontains
some novel ombinations of language features that have
not been studied before. The prinipal diÆulties are:
 Many dierent features need to be modelled, suh as
multi-threading, exeption handling, objet orienta-
tion and garbage olletion;
 Careful onsideration has to be given to the inter-
ation of these features. The oÆial SUN refer-
enes [28, 37℄ are sometimes ambiguous, inonsistent
and inomplete. See for example Bertelsen [4℄, who
provides a long list of ambiguities in the JVM spei-
ation. Curiously, other authors do nd the oÆial
SUN referenes omplete and unambiguous [22℄.
 The referene implementation is omplex (the SUN
JDK), and not always onsistent with the doumen-
tation.
Attrated by the potential benets, and hallenged by
the diÆulties, many authors have formalised aspets of
Java, and/or its implementation. At the time of writing
we ounted more than 40 teams of researhers from all
over the world. Many of those have speied the semantis
of subsets of Java. Others have worked on the semantis of
subsets of the JVM language. Some authors have worked
on both, often in an attempt at relating the two, with
the ultimate goal of proving the speiation of a Java
ompiler orret. To our knowledge, no single attempt has
been made at speifying full Java, the full JVM, or the
full ompiler. No attempts have been made at speifying
the relevant parts of the Java API.
The vast majority of the studies that we have found dis-
uss abstrations, to make the speiations more man-
ageable. Popular assumptions inlude:
 There is unlimited memory.
 Individual storage loations an hold all primitive
data types (i.e. byte as well as double).
 Individual JVM program loations an hold all byte
ode instrutions.
While suh abstrations help to redue lutter in the
speiations, they also make it impossible to model er-
tain safety problems, suh as jumping in the middle of an
instrution. It is an art to model systems preisely at the
right level of abstration, with just enough detail to be
able to disuss the features of interest.
2.1 Java and JVM language features
The Java and JVM languages have a number of interesting
features. Some apply only to Java, some to the JVM and
some to both. The most important aspets are:
IM Imperative ore onsisting of basi data, expressions
and statements.
OO Objet orientation, i.e. Objets, lasses, interfaes,
and arrays.




MT Multi-threading, monitors, synhronisation.
GC Garbage olletion.
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Most researhers in the eld model parts of the imper-
ative ore, and many also deal with objet orientation.
We will say no more about this ore, as it is well under-
stood. Instead, we will onentrate on the remaining is-
sues. Some authors model objets and lasses but not the
type system. Type soundness has been studied by quite a
few. The JVM implementation of exeption handling uses
a diÆult optimisation, whih is the reason why several
authors have studied this in detail. Multi-threading has
found favour only with few. We have not been able to
nd any work on modelling garbage olletion in the on-
text of studying either Java or the JVM. This is a prob-
lem beause garbage olletion is not transparent sine
dealloating an objet triggers its nalizer method. This
onnetion is atually ignored by some authors [5℄.
3 Java Semantis
In this paper we onentrate on the various reports found
in the literature on speifying the semantis of Java. The
most interesting aspet of studying the JVM (the byte
ode verier) is perhaps less relevant to Java implemen-
tations on smart ards, mainly beause it is so diÆult
to implement a byte ode verier within the limited re-
soures of a smart ard. However, we will revisit this issue
in Setion 6.
Our fous is on identifying the methodologial ap-
proahes and on the Java subsets being studied. The rea-
son is that some speiation methods, and in partiular
the aompanying support tools, are perhaps more appro-
priate for the task in hand than others. We are also keen
to identify methods and tools that are able to ope with
the largest amount of omplexity in the Java language,
with the most features taken into aount.
Table 1 gives a omplete summary, showing whether
the work is partiularly relevant to small footprint de-
vies, the purpose of the ativity, a referene to work on
whih the urrent work is based, the tools used, whether
the work applies to Java, the JVM or both, a harater-
isation of the subset studied, an indiation of the style
of semantis used, and whether any proofs have been re-
ported. The styles of semantis used are Denotational
Semantis (DS), Continuation Semantis (CS), Abstrat
State Mahine Semantis (ASM), Strutured Operational
Semantis (SOS), Natural Semantis (NS), a Higher Or-
der Logi (HOL) or a semantis based on that of the tool
used. See Nielson and Nielson [43℄ for an introdution
into programming language semantis.
3.1 Objet Orientation
Alves-Foss and Lam [1℄ present a denotational semantis
of most of Java (exluding multi-threading and garbage
olletion, but inluding lass loading). Their speia-
tion gives detail on the various basi data types in Java.
This ontributes to a better understanding of those as-
pets of the language.
3.2 The type system
The Java type system is based on simple sub typing, but it
has one novel feature: Java oers interfaes by way of re-
ating multiple inheritane. Drossopoulou and Eisenbah
were probably the rst to model this feature [24℄. They
give a stati semantis (i.e. a speiation of the type
system) and a dynami semantis (i.e. an interpreter of
Java programs that works with typed data) of a relatively
small subset of Java. Drossopoulou and Eisenbah then
state the soundness of their type system. In a separate pa-
per, Drossopoulou et al [23℄ extend their subset to inlude
exeption handling. Neither paper gives proofs. Instead
Syme [55℄ enodes some of the models of Drossopoulou
et al in his DECLARE system, and gives proofs. The
mere ativity of enoding hand built speiations in a
mehanised system is reported to unover 40 errors made
during the translation. More importantly, Syme has also
found two non-trivial errors in the hand written proofs of
Drossopoulou and Eisenbah.
Nipkow and von Oheimb [45℄ prove type soundness of
a similar subset to Drossopoulou et al. However, the for-
mer use Isabelle/HOL to mahine-hek the proofs from
the outset, giving a higher degree of ondene in the
orretness of the speiations and the proofs. While
the semantis are veried using a proof heker, Nipkow
and von Oheimb were not able to validate the speia-
tions due to the lak of support for generating exeutable
semantis [58℄. One onlusion of their work is that the-
orem provers are too sensitive to the preise formulation
of a speiation, and that more support in the provers
is needed to make working with semantis more aessi-
ble [58, Page 151℄.
Glesner and Zimmermann [26℄ speify the type system
for a small fragment of Java as an example of their work
on many sorted logi in natural semantis.
3.3 Class loader
Wragg et al [62℄ oer a model of lass loading for a rel-
atively small subset of Java to study one of Java's more
experimental features, i.e., that of binary ompatibility.
In Java it is possible to add methods and elds to a Java
lass, without having to reompile any lasses that import
the lass being modied. The work unovers a serious aw
in onnetion with interfaes.
3
First Author Ref. Small Purpose Base Tool Java/JVM no CL no EH no MT Semantis Proof
Alves-Foss [1℄ study semantis Java no MT DS
Bertelsen [5℄ study semantis Java no EH no MT DS
Borger [10℄ study semantis Java no CL ASM
Ceniarelli [13℄ study semantis Java no CL SOS proof
Demartini [18℄ veriation SPIN Java see tool proof
Drossopoulou [22℄ prove type soundness Java no CL no EH no MT SOS
Drossopoulou [23℄ prove type soundness [24℄ Java no CL no MT SOS
Drossopoulou [24℄ prove type soundness [22℄ Java no CL no MT SOS
Glesner [26℄ study semantis Java no CL no EH no MT NS
Havelund [31℄ veriation SPIN Java no EH see tool proof
Jaobs [32℄ veriation PVS Java no MT see tool proof
Jensen [33℄ veriation Java no CL no EH no MT SOS
Kassab [34℄ study seurity Java no CL no EH HOL
Nipkow [45℄ prove type soundness Isabelle/HOL Java no CL no EH no MT NS proof
Rustan [52℄ veriation [20℄ ESC/Java Java see tool proof
Syme [55℄ prove type soundness [23℄ DECLARE Java no CL no MT SOS proof
van den Berg [57℄ veriation [32℄ PVS, Isabelle/HOL Java no MT see tool proof
von Oheimb [58℄ prove type soundness [45℄ Isabelle/HOL Java no CL no MT NS proof
Wallae [59℄ study semantis Java no CL ASM
Wragg [62℄ study semantis [24℄ Java no CL no MT SOS
Borger [7℄ prove ompiler orret [11℄,[10℄ Java+JVM ASM
Borger [9℄ prove ompiler orret [11℄,[10℄ ASMGofer Java+JVM no CL no MT ASM proof sketh
Diehl [21℄ study semantis Java+JVM no CL no EH no MT ASM
Rose [50℄ small prove ompiler orret Java+JVM no EH no MT NS
Staerk [53℄ prove ompiler orret [11℄,[10℄ Java+JVM no CL ASM proof
Legend:
Small Whether the work is targeted at smart ards or small footprint devies
Purpose Main purpose of the author for writing the paper
Base A referene to work on whih the urrent work is based
Tools The formal methods or semantis tools used
no CL no model of lass loading
no EH no model of exeption handling
no MT no model of multi-threading
Semantis an indiation of the style of semantis used























Borger and Shulte [10℄, and Ceniarelli et al [13℄ model
multi-threading, at the Java level. The main interest in
these two papers is the study of the issues left open by
the oÆial SUN doumentation. For example, threads
are able to keep loal opies of information, until other
threads require aess to the information. Various opti-
misations are possible to optimise the management of this
information, and Ceniarelli et al. prove some optimisa-
tions orret.
This onludes our survey on formalising the seman-
tis of Java. We now onsider work on formalising the
ompiler in the next setion.
4 The ompiler
While a onsiderable amount of eort has been spent on
speifying the semantis of various subsets of Java and/or
the JVM, relatively little work has been done on the om-
piler. Table 1 inludes summaries of the eorts desribed
below.
Diehl [21℄ gives the ompilation shemes for a sub-
set of the Java that exludes exeption handling, multi-
threading and garbage olletion to the orresponding
subset of the JVM. He also gives an operational semantis
of this JVM subset. No speiation of the Java subset is
given, thus missing the opportunity to prove the ompi-
lation shemes orret.
Rose [50℄ gives a natural semantis of a subset of Java,
the orresponding subset of the JVM, stati type systems
for both and a speiation of the ompiler for the subsets.
No proofs are given either of the soundness of the type
systems, or of the orretness of the ompiler.
4.1 The Abstrat State Mahine ap-
proah
To onlude our disussion of Java language features we
mention a numbers of papers and a forthoming book that
take a more integrated approah towards the study of the
Java, the JVM and the ompiler. For a number of years,
Borger and Shulte have been working on formal spei-
ations of Java, the JVM and the ompiler. All their work
is based on the Abstrat State Mahine formalism, a full
semanti aount of whih may be found in Gurevih [29℄.
Two earlier papers speify a modular semantis of a sub-
set of the JVM [11℄, and a subset of Java [10℄. Both
speiations follow a modular approah, where eah new
feature is added to the speiation as a onservative ex-
tension. The two subsets do not entirely oinide; for
example, the Java speiation inludes multi-threading
but the JVM speiation does not. This makes the two
subsets somewhat less ideal as a basis for further work
to speify the ompiler and to prove the ompiler orret
with respet to the semantis of Java and the JVM. Yet
in a third paper [7℄ this is exatly what is done, by further
reduing the subsets of Java and the JVM to omit Multi-
threading, lass loading and arrays. The main result is an
informal theorem stating the orretness of the ompiler.
Two further papers by the same authors revisit exeption
handling and objet initialisation, again based on the two
initial papers. The rst of these further papers [8℄ re-
ports on problems with the initialisation of objets, for
whih the oÆial SUN doumentation provides onit-
ing information. The problems were identied thanks to
the building of the speiation. The seond paper [9℄
revisits the exeption handling mehanism of Java, the
JVM, and the ompiler. The main result is a formulation
of the orretness of ompiling exeption handling, with
a full proof. Stark [53℄ revisits the speiation of Java
and the JVM from Borger and Shulte [11, 10℄. Stark
also presents a ompiler from the imperative ore of Java
enrihed with method alls and gives a orretness proof
of the ompiler with respet to the semantis of Java and
the JVM for the same fragments. A forthoming book [6℄
promises a more omplete speiation of Java, the JVM,
the ompiler, the byte ode verier as well as orretness
proofs.
As to the methodology deployed, the papers by Borger
and Shulte do not give details. Most importantly, the
speiations are all provided in one notation (ASM),
whih is essential for a onsistent approah. While me-
hanial heking of the speiations is mentioned as a
hallenge to the ommunity [9℄, mehanial validation of
the speiations is supported by (hand) translating the
abstrat mahines into Haskell, using the ASMGofer sys-
tem. This allows ASM speiations to be exeuted and
thus to be validated.
Wallae gives a reasonably omplete speiation of
Java, also based on the ASM framework, but not losely
related to the work of Borger and Shulte. Wallae's work
inludes multi-threading, and exeption handling, but ex-
ludes lass loading and garbage olletion [60℄. The work
is purely a study of semantis.
5 Java extensions
Several authors propose to enhane the safety of Java pro-
grams by using program veriation tehniques. This on-
tributes to the safety of Java programs beause they may
be expeted to ontain fewer design and implementation
problems. While some of the work we report on below has
not been done speially for smart ards, it is relevant
for the pratial reason that programs or applets for smart
ards are generally intriate but small. This is something
that the tools we report on ope well with.
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5.1 Model heking
Demartini et al [18℄, and also Havelund et al [31℄ desribe
how ore features of Java an be mapped onto the Promela
language of the SPIN model heker. Both model multi-
threading and objets, Havelund et al also model exep-
tions. Both approahes model the objets using Promela's
arrays, with one array element per instane of the lass.
The resulting models quikly grow too large to model
hek eetively. Both approahes only hek for safety
properties (e.g. assertions, deadlok), and do not pro-
vide support for the heking of liveness properties. For
small Java programs this line of researh is useful, it is
diÆult to see how the result might sale up to larger sys-
tems. One of the most useful features of the SPIN model
heker is its ability to display senarios leading to prob-
lems suh as deadlok. Demartini et al take are to relate
these senarios bak to the original Java soures, making
their tool more user friendly than that of Havelund et al.
Jensen et al [33℄ also use model heking to verify prop-
erties of Java programs, but they use a more abstrat
approah than Demartini et al, or Havelund et al. In the
proposal by Jensen et al, stati analysis tehniques are
used to redue a Java program to a ontrol ow graph
with only three operations: method alls, method returns
and assertions. A simple operational semantis of the
three operations denes the state transitions of the ab-
strat Java program, and linear temporal logi formulae
dene the properties of the system. As an example of
use, Jensen et al show how the system an be used to
model Java's sandbox, or the stak inspetion introdued
by Java 2 [38℄.
5.2 Theorem proving
Detlefs et al, using Modula 3 [20℄, and more reently also
using Java [52℄, go beyond what type heking oers by
requiring the programmer to annotate programs with pre-
and post-onditions. The idea is that programmers do this
informally anyway, so it is not a big step to ask them to
annotate their programs formally. The ompiler is then
able to generate and prove the veriation onditions (us-
ing a form of Dijkstra's weakest pre-ondition alulus)
that need to be satised for the pre- and post-onditions
to hold. The system of Detlefs et al does not require the
programmer to annotate programs with loop invariants
and variants, whih most programmers would nd harder
than to write down than just the pre and post onditions.
Instead the system derives loop invariants automatially,
whih are weaker than those provided by humans. Alter-
natively the system may be direted to assume that loops
are exeuted at most one, thus giving rise to onservative
approximations to the real behaviour of loops. The sys-
tem is thus a ompromise between what is ahievable with
automated tehniques to date and what programmers are
able to provide. The system is therefore more powerful
than a type heker, but less powerful than programming
with full veriation.
The aim of the LOOP projet of Jaobs et al is full
veriation of Java programs. They use a denotational
semantis based tool to translate Java into the higher
order logi of widely used theorem provers (PVS [32℄,
or Isabelle/HOL [57℄). The user then expresses proper-
ties of the translated Java programs in higher order logi
and drives the appropriate theorem prover to develop the
proofs. Examples of properties inlude termination of a
method, or in-variants on the elds of a lass. While the
theorem provers provide a degree of automation, user in-
tervention is required for example to introdue loop vari-
ants and in-variants. The LOOP projet aspires to ahieve
full veriation of Java programs. While the projet is
building tools to assist the Java programmer, it is un-
lear how muh Java programmers will be expeted to
know about PVS, or Isabelle/Hol and tool assisted theo-
rem proving.
Poetzsh-Heter and Muller [47℄ give an operational
and an axiomati semantis of a subset set of Java (the
imperative ore and method alls). They then prove the
soundness of the axiomati semantis with respet to the
operational semantis. Their axiomati semantis an
thus be used to as a basis for the veriation of Java pro-
grams. Both types of semantis are also embedded in
HOL, so that mehanial heking of the soundness proof
would be feasible. This is proposed as future work.
Veriation is not restrited to Java programs.
Moore [39℄ has built a new version of a small subset of
Cohen's speiation [15℄ of the JVM. Moore shows how
the ACL2 theorem prover is apable not only of animat-
ing the semantis of simple byte ode programs, but also
of proving the orretness of suh programs, against a
speiation in terms of the models underlying programs.
Both Cohen and Moore's ACL2 speiations are rather
verbose, as the notation used in ACL2 is Lisp.
5.3 Controlling type asts
Java extensions an be onduive to better safety. One
partiular example is Java's lak of polymorphism, whih
requires programmers to insert type asts in their pro-
grams. Consider for example to olletion lasses in Java
2. The lass of the items being stored and manipulated
by the olletion lasses is objet. So when storing an
objet of some meaningful type, say MyObjet, one must
remember to ast the raw objet bak into the user lass
MyObjet when retrieving the information. Erroneous
type asts will eventually ause unexpeted runtime ex-
eptions. Java extensions like Pizza [46℄ and Generi
Java [12℄ address these problems by automatially insert-
ing the required type asts. Generi Java then guarantees
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that no ast inserted by the ompiler will fail. Generi
Java programs inter-work perfetly with legay ode, the
ompiler is even able to make legay Java ode available
for use with generiity without the need to even reompile
the legay ode.
5.4 Controlling exeution time
If Java safety would be able to guarantee that omputa-
tions terminate, and within ertain bounds, then the de-
nial of servie attak would be prevented, whih is learly
a desirable safety goal. However, exeution time is prob-
ably one of the most diÆult to ontrol resoures. While
there are languages [3℄ and type systems [16℄ that have
been designed to guarantee termination, we have not been
able to nd eorts that apply suh tehnology to Java.
5.5 Code ertiation
Neula and Lee introdued the idea of proof arrying ode
(PCC) [40℄. This is a partly automati veriation teh-
nique for assembly level programs designed to allow a ode
onsumer to have trust in the produts of a ode produer.
One might argue that this would then be not a Java but
more a JVM issue. However we report it here as it relies
on automati program veriation tehniques, like most
of the other work reported in this setion.
PCC works as follows (ignoring the negotiations be-
tween produer and onsumer about the safety poliy to
be used). The produer expresses a safety property in
terms of pre and post onditions on the program. In ad-
dition, the produer annotates the program, with loop
invariants et. Then the produer generates a proof of
the safety property, either by hand, or using a mehanial
proof assistant. The onsumer reeives the ode and the
proof, and mehanially heks that the proof is onsistent
with the program, and therefore that the program satises
the safety property. Sine it is more diÆult to generate
a proof than to hek it, separating the two phases has a
signiant benet: The onsumer does not need to trust
the produer, or the means by whih the produer reates
the ode and the proof. Instead, the onsumer relies only
on a small trusted infrastruture onsisting of what is es-
sentially a type heker. This is reported to be no more
than 5 pages of C ode in size.
One of the problems of the PCC approah is that the
size of a proofs may be exponential in the size of the
program [42℄. A proof may beome large beause of the
amount of redundany. Neula and Lee [41℄ show that it
is possible to redue a proof of size n to a proof of size
p
n
by avoiding some redundany. They also give pratial
examples of small programs (e.g. quik sort) with aept-
able proof sizes. In spite of this improvement, proofs may
still be exponentially large.
We onlude this setion with a autionary note. Pro-
gram veriation requires speial skills, to formulate prop-
erties, to disover appropriate loop invariants, to drive
mehanial theorem provers et. Few programmers have
these skills. It is thus essential that tools are automati,
or at least require as little programmer intervention as
possible.
6 Small footprint devies
Java implementations are resoure hungry. For example
even the smallest JVM implementations require at least
1 MB of store [61℄. This makes Java aeptable for use
in PCs and apaious embedded ontrollers but less than
ideal for use in small footprint devies, suh as mobile
phones, and PDAs. Even the K Virtual Mahine, whih
has been designed speially to t into small footprint de-
vies requires at least 128KB of RAM [54℄. Please note
that we are side stepping the fat that Java is not suitable
for real time appliations [61℄.
The most extreme example of a small devie is probably
a smart ard, whih typially oers a few hundred bytes
of RAM and a dozen or so KB of EEPROM. The urrent
solution for smart ards as liensed by Sun to the smart
ard industry is to subset Java and the JVM. Only pro-
grams written in the Java-Card subset an be run on the
Java-Card VM (JCVM). This has three disadvantages:
 The full potential and exibility of lient server soft-
ware development annot be realised beause devel-
opers need to be aware of the platform on whih their
ode is going to run (i.e. on or o ard).
 Java applets running on the smallest embedded on-
trollers annot be veried appropriately before they
are run beause the full byte ode verier is too large.
Current stopgap measures inlude digital signing of
pre-veried byte odes.
 The freedom of ode migration is restrited beause
not all platforms support full Java.
The implementation of Java for smart ards is based on
the Split VM onept, whih pushes part of the byte ode
veriation from the loading to the ompilation/linking
phase. A onverter from the JVM byte odes to the
JCVM format performs the byte ode veriation and op-
timises and prepares the ode for loading into the devie.
6.1 Byte ode ompression
Clausen et al [14℄ retain JVM byte odes, but propose to
ompress them for the benet of embedded systems. The
ompression tehnique works by disovering ommonly
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ourring sequenes of instrutions, whih are then re-
plaed by a new `maro' instrution. This requires mod-
iations to the JVM. While the tehnique is reported
to save up to 30% spae at the ost of an inrease of up
30% loading time, it remains unlear how the ompres-
sion tehnique interats with for example the byte ode
verier.
6.2 Class le onversion
Hartel et al [30℄ provide a omplete speiation of an
early version of the JCVM, the Java Seure Proessor
(JSP). The JSP subset exludes multi-threading, garbage
olletion and exeption handling, mainly beause the lim-
ited resoures on a smart ard would not be able to sup-
port these features. The speiations have been vali-
dated using the letos tool.
An interesting methodologial point to note is that the
earlier JSP was designed essentially by starting from the
full JVM, and then utting bak unwanted features. The
newer KVM on the other hand has been designed from
srath, adding features as required. This latter method
is more likely to yield a oherent result and is therefore
reommended [56℄. The developers of the pioPERC ver-
sion of the JVM take a dierent and promising looking ap-
proah. They oer a ore VM (still requiring 64KB) and
provide tools to add further funtionality to the ore VM.
Unfortunately, no details are provided in the paper [44℄.
Lanet and Requet [35℄ use the B-method (and the asso-
iated toolkit `Atelier B') to study one partiular aspet of
the onversion from JVM to JCVM ode. This is the op-
timisation that replaes JVM instrutions with int type
arguments by JCVM instrutions that take byte, short
or int as appropriate. Their results inlude:
1. A speiation of the onstraints imposed by the byte
ode verier for a small subset (the imperative ore
and method alls) of the JVM.
2. A speiation of the semantis of this subset of the
JVM byte odes.
3. A speiation of the semantis of the orresponding
subset of the JCVM byte odes.
4. A proof that the speiation of the JCVM subset is
a data renement of the JVM subset.
The subsets are small, and the dierenes between the
JCVM and the JVM are small. However, the work by
Lanet and Requet shows how the B-method an be used
suessfully, and suintly to make the proof.
Denney and Jensen [19℄ study an aspet that is om-
plementary to that studied by Lanet and Requet. The
former study the onversion of JVM lass les to JCVM
lass les by a `tokenisation' proess. This replaes names
in the lass les by more ompat representations, thus re-
duing the size of the lass les as well as speeding up the
loading proess. Denney and Jensen take essentially the
same four steps as Lanet and Requet above. However,
Denney and Jensen use the Coq theorem prover to me-
hanially hek their proofs. They also use an elegant
method to parameterise their operational semantis over
name resolution. Therefore, only one operational seman-
tis is required, that is abstrat with respet to the atual
name resolution method, and thus ommon to both the
JVM and JCVM subsets.
6.3 Byte ode veriation revisited
As we said before, a small footprint devie (a smart ard)
does not have enough memory to perform byte ode veri-
ation. The split VM onept stipulates o-line veria-
tion, and signing the results digitally. When loading the
ode all that needs to be heked is the signature, not the
ode itself. This plaes onsiderable trust in digital signa-
tures: one the underlying keys are ompromised, veried
byte ode beomes worthless.
Instead of a verier based on type heking, Posegga
and Vogt [49, 48℄ propose to use a model heker to per-
form o-line byte ode veriation for smart ards. Their
argument is that a tried and tested model heker (SMV)
is easier to trust than a Java byte ode verier. They give
no supporting evidene for this laim. In a separate pa-
per [27℄, Posegga et al propose to implement a tiny proof
heker on a smart ard. The proof heker would then
be able to reason about trust poliies set by the user. The
result appear to be somewhat disappointing, as proving
theoremhood of some simple rst order logi formulaemay
take of the order of minutes.
Rose and Rose [51℄ do not wish to rely on digital sig-
natures for the safety of byte ode veriation on smart
ards. Instead they use Neula and Lee's proof arrying
ode method to `split' the byte ode verier as follows.
The rst step (the veriation) is to reonstrut the types
assoiated with all loal variables and stak loations of
JVM ode. The seond step (the ertiation) is to hek
based on the reonstruted types, that eah instrution
is orretly typed. The advantages are, rstly that the
ertiation proess is simple, so that it is feasible to im-
plement it on a smart ard; the more omplex veriation
an be arried out on a host. The seond advantage is that
only the ertiation needs to be trusted, not the veria-
tion. This makes the trusted infrastruture smaller than
in a standard Java implementation. Rose and Rose show
that for a small subset of the JVM, onsisting essentially
of parts of the imperative ore with method alls, erti-
ation is sound and omplete. This means that the sepa-
rated verier and heker agree exatly with the original
byte ode verier. The paper ontains some annoying,
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whih ould have been avoided if Rose and Rose had used
tool support. Furthermore, exeption handling has been
omitted, whih as we have seen before does ompliate
byte ode veriation onsiderably.
7 Conlusions
Java programs oer type and memory safety beause of
properties of the Java language. However, it has proved
diÆult to implement the safety features orretly. The
main reason is that building a Java system with aept-
able performane requires various optimisations, whih
basially distribute the implementation of safety features
throughout the ompiler and dierent parts of the run
time system. The various omponents responsible for
safety interat in omplex ways, reating sope for de-
sign and implementation problems. Yet in spite of all the
optimisations, Java programs today are still slower than
C or C++ programs.
New implementation tehniques are needed to make
Java simpler and faster, whilst at the same time making
the implementations more amenable to formal modelling.
Formal models oer a way of studying the dierent om-
ponents responsible for safety, and for studying the inter-
ations between these omponents.
Not all formal methods and semantis tools (ACL2, AS-
MGofer, Atelier B, Coq, DECLARE, ESC/Java, Haskell,
Isabelle/HOL, LETOS, PVS, SMV, SpeWare, SPIN)
that have been brought to bear on Java are suÆiently
automati, or suÆiently equipped with the right math-
ematial theories to prove safety properties of Java pro-
grams.
There is no lear winner amongst the various methods
and tools used. The Abstrat State Mahines has been
used to build the most omprehensive set of speiations.
Isabelle/HOL is one of the most popular tools, but even its
users omplain about laking mathematial theories and
validation failities [58℄. This learly needs improvement.
Almost all eorts that we have disussed, either to for-
malise parts of Java, or its implementation have unov-
ered ambiguities and inonsistenies in the oÆial SUN
doumentation, and/or problems with the various imple-
mentations. This should be onsidered a lear suess of
applying formal tehniques. However, muh work remains
to be done:
 On modelling garbage olletion, and the Java API.
 On building more appropriate theories for program-
ming language semantis modelling.
 On simplifying and modularising the individual om-
ponents of Java implementations.
 On reduing the size of the trusted omputing base,
so that aws are less likely to ompromise the seurity
of the system as a whole.
 On onsidering formal speiation, validation and
provably orret implementation as a whole, rather
than in separation.
 On presenting lear and onise formalisations of sys-
tems, whih are aessible to the designers and im-
plementors of these systems.
 On using mahine-readable speiations.
We believe that work in eah of these areas is both in-
teresting and will lead to novel results, as the ombination
of features oered by Java is rather dierent from other
languages.
We have made an eort to survey all relevant literature
on Java safety, and in partiular the relation with smart
ards. We have tried to make the survey as aurate as
possible. However, we welome to hear about work that
we have not surveyed yet, and about errors and inaura-
ies in the survey.
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